Henry Kissinger’s Cold-War Avoiding Analysis of Conflicting American and Chinese Mindsets Is Well Done — His Prescription for Conflict’s Resolution Is Unlikely to Happen

© 2011 Peter Free

 

14 January 2011

 

 

Creating the idea of a “Pacific community” as an antidote to unnecessary conflict

 

Former (1973-1977) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed concern that conflicting American and Chinese cultural mindsets could lead to cold war.

 

His formula for prevention lies in fostering a mutual Sino-American dedication to the extra-national idea of creating a “Pacific community.”

 

 

But — two societies that see themselves as exceptional are unlikely to make substantive headway in creating a common extra-national goal

 

Peace Nobel laureate Kissinger points out that Americans and Chinese see themselves as exceptional cultures.

 

Cultural traits compound the difficulty:

 

Reconciling the two versions of exceptionalism is the deepest challenge of the Sino-American relationship.

 

America has found most problems it recognized as soluble. China, in its history of millennia, came to believe that few problems have ultimate solutions.

 

America has a problem-solving approach; China is comfortable managing contradictions without assuming they are resolvable.

 

A concept of a Pacific community could become an organizing principle of the 21st century to avoid the formation of blocs.

 

For this, they need a consultative mechanism that permits the elaboration of common long-term objectives and coordinates the positions of the two countries at international conferences.

 

The aim should be to create a tradition of respect and cooperation so that the successors of leaders meeting now continue to see it in their interest to build an emerging world order as a joint enterprise.

 

© 2011 Henry A. Kissinger, Avoiding a U.S.-China cold war, Washington Post (14 January 2011) (paragraphs split)

 

 

Secretary Kissinger’s “cooperate in the big picture” idea is an attractive prescription, but probably unachievable

 

American impatience aggravates the Republic of China’s legitimate sensitivity toward perceived disrespect.  Given that time and China’s rapid development favor its rising preeminence in Asia, it is difficult to see what China has to gain from actively cooperating (as opposed to managing serial disharmonies) with the United States in creating a Pacific community.  (Whatever that is.)

 

Historical experience supports China’s rejection of ultimate solutions.  The United States’ competing record for geopolitical problem solving in recent decades is abysmally bad.  Culturally, China’s “management and stall” view forward is probably more realistic than the United States’ “tame the bull” approach.

 

Consequently, I am more pessimistic about forestalling U.S.-PRC conflict than Secretary Kissinger allows himself to be.  Human beings can be counted on to find myriad ways in which to screw things up for themselves and each other.  Pacific community — in a workably peaceful, economically constructive, cross-cultural geopolitical sense — is probably an illusion.

 

Take two examples of the general “that’s hard to do” principle:

 

The United Nations “community” itself stands as a beacon to the irrepressibility of national and personal self-interest and the consequent mismanagement of the planet as a whole.  The UN has a really bad record for defusing conflict and an even worse one in dealing with it once it turns to armed force.

 

One, also, needs to go no further than an examination of the United States’ miserable history in regard to Central and South America to see that even an unopposed hegemon cannot rise above its narrower interests for the good of the hemisphere.

 

 

Conclusion — good analysis from Secretary Kissinger, but an alternative plan is also necessary

 

Pacific community?  Probably not.  Not in a way that constitutes a marked departure from the past.

 

The United States will need a Plan B — which should flexibly court Asian states by exhibiting genuine American assistance to their ways socioeconomically upward.

 

 

Our comparative strength and weakness are on display

 

On the positive side, in contrast to China, our freedom example still stands for something.  Provided we manage to keep pace with China’s authoritarian version of capitalism.

 

That’s the biggest challenge.

 

The third world is watching China outcompete the United States, economically.  Freedom in abject poverty is less appealing than passable economic comfort under an authoritarian regime.  Witness the Russian post-Soviet experience.

 

Right now, our positive example is dimmed by (i) China’s more glamorous economic example, (ii) our self-indulgent national debt, and (iii) our self-destructive military imperialism.

 

 

Our biggest challenge, ultimately, is our own crumbling house

 

The United States’ biggest challenge today is getting its own house in economic and international order.

 

China has done that.  We have not.