US and European Reactions to the Crimean Situation Are Poorly Thought Out — and May Be Pushing Russia into another Territorial Expansion

© 2014 Peter Free

 

21 March 2014

 

 

As an ex-cop, I know when trash-talking and perceived unfairness on the street is going to turn the tables — to everyone’s disadvantage

 

There seems to be something in the human psyche that likes to push situations to the exploding point, then expresses surprise when everything goes to hell.

 

We are getting to that point now with the West’s arguable mishandling of the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea.

 

America’s historically ignorant, neo-Nazi-manipulating, and economically provocative response to the Crimean situation may actually push Russia into annexing more of Ukraine.

 

 

First — geopolitical background

 

The Obama Administration — which always tries to fend off Right Wing attacks about its foreign policy “pussiness” by acting Big Boy tough — has decided to make an issue of Russia’s annexation of Crimea — which effectively speaking had already been theirs for two centuries.

 

The West’s anti-occupation argument boils down to the allegation that Russia is an evil flouter of international law and democratic aspirations.  In the West’s view, the reemergence of Soviet-style assaults on All Things Just must be stopped.

 

If we believe American babble, the Russian Federation must be expelled from the International Community of Godly Righteousness, as part of an economic effort led by the Angelic Administrator of All Things Liberty.

 

 

Lost in this posturing is any truthful sense of what the Russian Federation has actually done, or why it did it

 

I have previously addressed America’s trash talking hypocrisy, here and here.

 

Yesterday, former American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack F. Matlock Jr, said the same thing.

 

Note

 

Ambassador Matlock was appointed to that position by President Ronald Reagan and served in as the United States’ representative in the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991.

 

His credentials are respect-worthy and include 35 years as a Foreign Service careerist, historian, linguist, and expert on the cold war Soviet Union.

 

Ambassador Matlock told AlterNet:

 

 

[W]hat we have seen is a reaction [in Crimea] . . . to a long history of what the Russian government, the Russian president and many of the Russian people . . . feel has been a pattern of American activity that has been hostile to Russia and has simply disregarded their national interests.

 

They feel that having thrown off communism, having dispensed with the Soviet Empire, that the U.S. systematically . . .

 

started expanding NATO to the east . . .

using NATO to carry out what they consider offensive actions . . . against . . . Serbia [a Russian ally]  . . .

detached territory from it . . .

then continued to place bases in these countries,

to move closer and closer to borders,

and

then to talk of taking Ukraine, most of whose people didn’t want to be a member of NATO, into NATO . . . .

 

[T]his began an intrusion into an area which the Russians are very sensitive.

 

Now, how would Americans feel if some Russian or Chinese or even West European started putting bases in Mexico or in the Caribbean, or trying to form governments that were hostile to us?

 

I think that we have not been very attentive to what it takes to have a harmonious relationship with Russia.

 

© 2014 Juan González, Years of American Hostility to Russia Sparked Crimea Crisis Former U.S. Ambassador Says, AlterNet (20 March 2014) (paragraph split and reformatted)

 

 

In regard to the US contribution to toppling the democratically elected — pro-Russia, admittedly corrupt — Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovich . . .

 

Ambassador Matlock added that:

 

 

[I]n the Orange Revolution in Kiev, foreigners, including Americans, were very active in organizing people and inspiring them.

 

I have to ask Americans: How would Occupy Wall Street have looked if you had foreigners out there leading them? Do you think that would have helped them get their point across? I don’t think so.

 

And I think we have to understand that when we start directly interfering, particularly our government officials, in the internal makeup of other governments, we’re really asking for trouble.

 

[W]e were pretty careful not to do that in my day.

 

I recall, for example, when I was being consulted by the newly elected leaders of what was still Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania. They were still in the Soviet Union, and they would come to us.

 

We were, of course, sympathetic to their independence; we had never even recognized that they were legally part of the Soviet Union.

 

But I had to tell them, "Keep it peaceful. If you are suppressed, there’s nothing we can do about it. We cannot come and help you. We’re not going to start a nuclear war." Well, they kept it peaceful, despite provocations.

 

Now, what have we been telling the Ukrainians, the Georgians . . . .

 

"Just hold on. You can join NATO, and that will solve your problems for you."

 

As George Kennan [a highly regarded “containment” strategist of that era] wrote back in the ’90s . . . the decision to expand NATO the way it was done was one of the most fateful and bad decisions of the late 20th century.

 

© 2014 Juan González, Years of American Hostility to Russia Sparked Crimea Crisis Former U.S. Ambassador Says, AlterNet (20 March 2014) (extracts)

 

 

How will retaliatory Western economic sanctions against the Federation play out?

 

Perhaps poorly — for reasons that any competent geopolitical strategist can foresee.

 

 

Strategic analysis — what the players bring to the table

 

Let’s start with an abbreviated synopsis of strengths and weaknesses of both sides:

 

Russia has military clout and fervent nationalism on its adjacent terrain, but its “tank power” is attached to a weak economic base.

 

The West wields economic clout globally, but its “bucks-bam” is attached to a military base and public opinion(s) that dare not confront a nuclear-armed nation on or near its own turf.

 

 

How does each side play its comparative advantage to the fullest — and why so?

 

One must always compare the cost of executing an action to the geopolitical worth of what the anticipated action might gain.

 

It is here that I think Western thinking is missing the boat, even in regard to our own stated goals of protecting Law and international order.  The bottom line is that, when you push an adversary into a corner (even if only by applying economic sanctions), you generally get more hostility — this time potentially armed with bullets, missiles, and bombs.

 

Given the West’s past intrusions on Russia’s sphere of influence and the West self-righteously imposed economic sanctions — were I in President Putin’s shoes and:

 

(a) could count on the support of people(s), who had the spunk to fight off the Third Reich on Russian and Soviet soil,

 

(b) under economic circumstances metaphorically mildly similar to those they experienced during the Great Patriotic War,

 

and

 

(c) the West does not back off from its continuing harassment of legitimate Russian realpolitik,

 

then I would seriously consider expanding the scope of conflict by entering Russian-friendly parts of the rest of Ukraine.

 

The West would almost certainly not respond militarily, which means that Russian territory would expand still further.

 

For the Russian Federation, the cost-benefit ratio of such an invasion would depend on:

 

(a) the volume of losses incurred during the acquisition

 

and

 

(b) those added afterward in maintaining the annexation.

 

These latter negatives would include the West’s economic retaliation, as well as local separatist tumult.

 

However, the benefits to an expanded Ukrainian annexation might be noticeable:

 

(i) the Federation would gain more geographic buffer against the ever-encroaching West,

 

(ii) it would be grabbing an economy that is noticeably stronger than Crimea’s weak one,

 

and

 

(iii) it would have the payback pleasure of sticking a thumb in the West’s perennially hypocritical eye.

 

This is what I mean by the short sightedness that is involved in aggressively cornering an adversary, when it is not necessary to do so.

 

An opponent’s pride, and the physical and psychological resistance that goes with it, should always be considered when assessing the value of initiating conflicts between people and nations.

 

People with street “cred” know this.  Most of the (arguably effete and privileged) folks who run American and European governments seem not to.

 

 

Are impetuously imposed Western economic sanctions —combined with braggadocio — the best avenues of objection to Russia’s occupation of Crimea?

 

Probably not.

 

Kicking a locally powerful adversary, in a contemptuous way, is almost always a bad self-preservation idea.

 

 

Consider this

 

How would you react if your opponent ran the world,

 

and

 

“his” hypocritically imposed economic net always worked to his advantage and never to yours?

 

Would you sit back and take it up the “bum” — or would you slash back, even if necessarily in a self-destructive way?

 

You already know how Ambassador Matlock and I answer that question.

 

 

Effective geopolitics boils down to consideration of another nation’s perspective — as evaluated within a realistically appraised balance of power

 

When it becomes necessary to consider pushing an opponent, competent strategists make a sensible calculation of:

 

(i) what is realistically at stake

 

and

 

(ii) how the long-term result of pushing the status quo might help or hurt goal attainment.

 

Pertinent here, we Americans are:

 

 

bad at demonstrating respect (except to ourselves),

 

poor at thinking in the strategic long term,

 

and

 

our hubristic disregard for these weaknesses has repeatedly kept us from attaining the goals that we purport to aim at.

 

Only a fool further aggravates a survival-oriented adversary, in a dispute over territory in which the fool has no particularly significant national interest.  That, sadly, is the position of the United States has taken today in regard to Crimea.

 

The argument that the United States has to uphold the Rule of Law everywhere is a facetious one — especially given our very long record of stomping all over it.

 

Challenging the Russians in provocative fashion over Crimea is a mistake.  As we continue to do this, we will make a bad situation (which we had a significant hand in creating) even more potentially explosive.

 

It would be nice if America, for once, demonstrated that it has a few grown-ups in charge.

 

 

 

The moral? — Hypocritically indulged American arrogance is not the way to sound geopolitical strategy

 

Russians have historically proven how ferociously they defend what they think is theirs.  Strategically speaking, were I President Putin, I would be willing to challenge aggressive America in the Federation’s own sphere of geopolitical influence.

 

My guess is that the harder the West pushes the Russian Federation, the harder and more frequently it will push back.

 

Never underestimate national pride.  Russia’s ate Napoleon and Hitler.  Respect is warranted, especially when we Americans have nothing much pertinent to our own survival on the line.

 

Ambassador Matlock, apparently thinking the same thing, advised yesterday that:

 

 

[W]e should start keeping our voice down and sort of let things work out.

 

[T]o ship in military equipment and so on is just going to be a further provocation. Obviously, this is not something that’s going to be solved by military confrontations.

 

I think if we can find a way to speak less in public, to use more quiet diplomacy . . . .

 

[I]t’s going to be the Ukrainians who have to put their society back together.

 

[T]hey could take a leaf from the Finns, who have been very successful ever since World War II in putting together a country with both Finns and Swedes,

 

by treating them equally,

 

by being very respectful and careful about their relations with Russia,

 

never getting into . . . into military struggles

 

or allowing foreign bases on their land.

 

And they’ve been extremely successful. Why can’t the Ukrainians follow a policy of that sort?

 

© 2014 Juan González, Years of American Hostility to Russia Sparked Crimea Crisis Former U.S. Ambassador Says, AlterNet (20 March 2014) (extracts)

 

That’s how realpolitik is played. By adults, rather than testosterone-poisoned adolescents.