Blaine Harden, The Great Leader and the Fighter Pilot (2015) — a book review

27 August 2017

Superb novel-like history

Blaine Harden's, The Great Leader and the Fighter Pilot (Viking 2015) is an exquisitely flowing overview of unrelentingly despicable tyrant Kim Il Sung's rise to power in North Korea.

Harden combines Kim's story with that of a North Korean fighter pilot's (No Kum Sok) successful MiG-15 escape to South Korea and the United States.

Though this combination of historically accurate tales seems an unlikely one, it works exquisitely in Harden's talented hands. The book avoids any trace of the yawn-inspiring tedium that so often accompanies its telling.

And readers may learn something

Nothing regarding Kim Il Sung's loathsome existence will come as a surprise to most Americans. However, the author insightfully emphasizes Kim's genius at repetitively wresting dominating control out of what appears to be ignominious defeat and clearly displayed political weakness.

If one wants a manual prescribing how the Devil's metaphorical disciple can to turn difficult circumstances into megalomaniacal political and military control, this book would be it. By focusing on summary examples of Kim's conniving, Harden exposes the gist of Kim's controlling techniques. Kim's grandson, Kim Jong Un, follows the recipe just as viciously today.

What readers may not know includes Harden's summary of Kim's interactions with Stalin and Mao Zedong. These demonstrate how North Korea's relationship to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China evolved.

Stalin's callous geopolitical maneuvering, especially in intentionally extending the Korean War at his supposed allies' (North Korea and China) human expense, will not surprise. But Mao's more subtly reasoned ones might.

Trapped by circumstances into protecting the new communist-controlled Chinese state, Mao skillfully maneuvered between the dominant Soviets (whose aid China required) and Kim, whom he and Stalin considered to be a recklessly dangerous fool. Mao's mix of caution and aggressiveness, when the latter was necessary, still characterizes Chinese leadership.

Noteworthy, also, is how an impossibly narcissistic and militarily inept leader (Kim) nevertheless climbed power's ultimate peak. His dynastic influence outlasted Stalin and Mao. The example set by the most vicious figure of all still rules.

A leader's obvious ineptitude at governance is not a guard against totalitarian-inspired societal catastrophe. The ability to manipulate followers' minds dominates most other skills.

A negative aspect of the Korean air war

Harden emphasizes how the United States' North Korea-obliterating air war reinforced Kim's propaganda about supposedly evil America. Nothing like pretty obviously unnecessary deaths to reinforce propaganda's accumulated lies.

The continuation of this kill-on-the-cheap mentality defeats America's stated peace objectives, even today.

Once war begins — controlling the range of its manifestations is impossible

Harden's readers will notice that the American fighter pilots followed Russian, Chinese and North-Korean MiGs back into China against explicit Washington orders. That's an example of how combat conditions understandably overrule geopolitical common sense.

All three powers were eager to avoid a greater war. Consequently, nobody said anything about either (a) the communists' launching attacks from what was then Manchuria or (b) the Americans' implemented determination to eliminate those.

When pilot No escaped to South Korea, American authorities had him deny that he had personally witnessed Americans blasting landing MiGs in Manchuria. No was accustomed to government lying, so he acquiesced.

Harden emphasizes another aspect of the MiG-chasing Manchurian air war. American pilots were so eager to become aces (5 kills necessary) that they made a practice of pouncing on landing and out of fuel MiGs.

Controlling forbidden territory ace-lust would have been difficult. Even had American air commanders wanted to.

Once launched, war makes its own rules.

Regarding the MiG-15 — another caution for today's American strategists

Though the 15 could climb faster than America's Sabres, it had some gross defects. Harden's account appears to disagree with Wikipedia's statement that the MiG-15 equaled to Sabre.

Harden explains the aircraft's weaknesses, which included effectively blinding and stall-killing its own pilots.

Two famous American test pilots, who flew No's MiG-15, appear to agree with Harden's implied conclusion about the MiG's dogfighting inferiority.

These were [subsequently Major General] Harold E. "Tom" Collins and [subsequently Brigadier General] Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager:

After eleven test flights, the verdict from Collins and Yeager was that the MiG-15 accelerated very nicely and had a high rate of climb, which made it a "usable weapon for high-altitude interception of bomber aircraft" — precisely what the honchos had done while shooting down B-29s.

But the test pilots also found that the plane's "handling qualities and Mach number limitations make it an inferior fighter-to-fighter weapon."

A lesson for modernity is buried in this is this section of the book. It begins like this. When Mao complained to Stalin that China would not contribute ground troops to the war unless the Soviets gave them some air cover, Stalin sent a group of experienced World War II aces to Manchuria. This particular group fought off American pilots on reportedly equal terms.

When Stalin soon tired of contributing to the war, he withdrew the experienced Russian pilots and sent grossly inadequately trained substitutes. The new Russian pilots were barely better in combat than the outclassed Chinese and North Koreans that they were supposed to assist. American kill-the-bad-guy ratios rose markedly in our favor.

I suspect that we took an inflated message from these numbers. Harden's implication is cautionary. When experienced and motivated, even if operating arguably inferior war machinery, Russians should not be underestimated.

A $100,000 reward for MiG-flying defectors

During the Korean War, the United States dropped leaflets promising a $100,000 reward to pilots who flew a MiG into American hands. Pilot No did not know this prior to landing in South Korea. He defected exclusively to achieve freedom. Being an American had been his childhood goal. He was upset that American authorities thought otherwise.

No became more upset when authorities told him about the reward and then — evidently on President Eisenhower's understandable but unhelpful micro-managing — tried to withhold it.

Harden's explication of this long-lasting mess demonstrates how government's words and national honor often seem to be out of synch.

Related to honor — how troops behave matter

Soviet troops had a terrible reputation in defeated Germany and North Korea. Pillaging, raping and intoxicated lunacy were characteristic. (Stalin eventually intervened in both places to get his commanders to exert more control.)

Pilot No witnessed both sides to this — (a) pillaging-raping Soviet infantry, as well as (b) cultivated, well-behaved Russian pilots with whom he interacted during his training.

At one point, Harden mentions how impressed No was with the American troops he saw.

The book is filled with interesting people

Some of these "characters" are astonishing in what they were able to achieve or get away with. I do not want to spoil the book by mentioning examples.

With regard to No Kum Sok, one admires his quick intelligence and unremitting political survival skill. His story is an instruction-like example of how to conceal one's plotting defiance, while inside a totalitarian state.

Harden's writing flows easily

Here is an example, making a typically summarizing point:

The leaders who emerged, Kim in the North and Syngman Rhee in the South, were aggressive, egocentric nationalists.

Each wanted to reunite Korea on his own uncompromising terms. Each wanted to rule it all, with weapons, money, and ideological window dressing from his superpower patron.

And another one:

In the Yalu corridor, [the Americans] could no longer embark on leisurely, risk-free missions to blow up bridges, supply depots, and airfields.

In the month that Kim [Il Sung] visited Uiju airfield, fifty-five American were killed, as MiGs shot down eight B-29s. It was the worst month of the war for the U.S. Air Force. The worst day was October 23, which became known as Black Tuesday, when eighty-four MiGs shredded an American bombing formation . . . .

The MiG pilots responsible for Black Tuesday . . . were the Russians who had eaten caviar with No Kum Sok.

Beginning in April 1951, while based in Manchuria's Dandong airfield, a few miles from the North Korean border, they confronted, outflew, and outgunned some of the best combat pilots in the U.S. Air Force. With respect and fear, American pilots called them the "honchos," from a Japanese word for "boss."

With regard to this latter passage, Harden goes on to explain how Russians and Americans essentially cooperated in keeping this a secret from the American public. Neither side's leader wanted a wider war.

The Truman Administration laughably blamed the losses on the Chinese, whom the Air Force chief of staff told the press, "Almost overnight, Communist China has become one of the major airpowers of the world." (at page 103)

This episode should bring a smile of recognition to the faces of those who suspect equally blatant American government lying these days. See, for example (with regard to Syria), here and here.

Book's shortcomings?

Harden occasionally omits footnotes for passages that should arguably have been attributed. But, given the summary nature of the book and its intended general readership, I doubt that this matters.

Those whose interest is activated by this fine account can subsequently read more scholarly sources.

The moral? — The Great Leader and the Fighter Pilot is outstanding

The book is an enjoyably informative overview of:

aspects of the Kim Dynasty's 'web of lies' population-control technique

and

one admirable man's skillful way of evading that oppression.

It is difficult to write history in such an engaging way. Blaine Harden makes it look easy. Genius.

PeteFree.com

Blaine Harden, The Great Leader and the Fighter Pilot (2015) — a book review