In Fat Cat America — Our Metaphorically Porky Upper Class Never Pays the Price for Sucking other People’s Lives Dry — a Completely Representative Example from the Marine Corps’ Alleged Sacking of Two Generals — an Action that Rewarded, rather than Punished, the Incompetence that Led to the Camp Bastion (Afghanistan) Disaster in September 2012

03 October 2013

If commanders’ gross incompetence or uncaring negligence gets troops killed — should they be definitively punished or paid a bunch of money?

Guess which response is the American paradigm.

To wit, the Marine Corps’ pretended “discipline” of the two generals who were responsible for what military analyst John Gresham characterized last year as the Corps’ greatest aviation disaster since Vietnam:

[O]n Friday, Sept. 14, 2012, a Taliban insurgent force of sappers carried out an attack on Camp Bastion, the NATO ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] base in Afghanistan, resulting in the worst loss of U.S. airpower in a single incident since the Vietnam War.

Two Marines [Sgt. Bradley Atwell and the VMA-211’s commanding officer, Lt. Col. Christopher Raible], were killed in the attack, and nine other personnel . . . were wounded.

By the time the base was secured roughly five hours later, six U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) AV-8B+ Harrier “jump jets” had been destroyed, and two more “significantly” damaged.

As a result of this attack, the air strength of Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211 – “The Avengers”) presumably 10 aircraft, was almost completely destroyed.

[T]he . . . attack on Camp Bastion is arguably the worst day in USMC aviation history since the Tet Offensive of 1968.

The last time VMA-211 was combat ineffective was in December 1941, when the squadron was wiped out during the 13-day defense of Wake Island against the Japanese.

Eight irreplaceable aircraft (the AV-8B has been out of production since 1999) have been destroyed or put out of action – approximately 7 percent of the total flying USMC Harrier fleet. Worse yet, the aircraft involved were the AV-B+ variant equipped with the APG-65 radar and AAQ-28 Litening II targeting pods – the most capable in the force.

Given the current funding situation, it’s likely that the two damaged AV-8Bs will become spare parts “hangar queens” and never fly again.

[T]he nearby Marines at Camp Freedom are now without effective fixed-wing air support.

The USMC’s response to this disaster will be a telling report card on its leadership and organizational agility.

For more on the Camp Bastion attack, see:

John Hudson, The U.S. Suffered Its Worst Airpower Loss Since Vietnam Last Week and No One Really Noticed, Atlantic Wire (21 September 2012)

Brian Todd, Camp Bastion attack details, The Situation Room — CNN (18 September 2012)

What happened to the two Marine Corps commanders, who let this happen?

They were forced to retire at Major General’s retirement pay — with a full complement of gold-plated retirement benefits:

Two senior Marine Corps generals have been ordered to take early retirement after being found responsible for errors in judgment and failure to provide adequate security at a base in southwestern Afghanistan that was the scene of a deadly — and humiliating — insurgent attack last year that killed two Marines and destroyed six Harrier attack jets.

Gen. James F. Amos, the Marine Corps commandant, announced the disciplinary action on Monday.

He said the punishments were unprecedented in modern Marine Corps history and were an effort “to remain true to the timeless axioms relating to command responsibility and accountability.”

Colonel Raible had actually raised concerns about security on the eastern side of Bastion, where the attack occurred, but it is not clear whether those concerns ever reached General Gurganus or General Sturdevant.

Take away lesson?

If I’m a general — or any other category of Big Whig — I can get my troops killed by being a dumb ass, and the worst I face is being forced to retire as a rich person.

I still get to call myself “General (retired)”, with all the prestige and lobbying potential that the title brings with it.

How’s that for rewarding negligent incompetence of floor hitting proportion?

Did the Marine Corps fully recognize the magnitude of these generals’ screw ups?

Oh, yes. That’s what makes this whole incident so laughably bitter:

The findings pull no punches against Maj. Gen. Charles Gurganus, the commanding general of Regional Command Southwest (emphasis added):

MajGen Gurganus maintained overall command responsibility for RC(SW) and knew, or should have known, of the force protection risks at the BLS Complex.

He underestimated the threat posed by the enemy’s capabilities, overestimated US and coalition capabilities to counter that threat, and failed to take prudent steps to counter or mitigate an enemy attack.

Further, he failed to achieve the coalition unity of effort necessary to ensure comprehensive protection of the BLS Complex or, alternatively, to take unilateral action to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level.

Lastly, MajGen Gurganus failed to adequately provide command direction and oversight to ensure his subordinates took appropriate actions to effectively mitigate the identified vulnerabilities at the Camp Bastion airfield.

The same goes for Maj. Gen. Gregg Sturdevant, who commanded the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (emphasis added):

MajGen Sturdevant failed to effectively integrate 3rd MAW(FWD) into the force protection posture for Camp Bastion.

He assumed that other units responsible for the protection of the BLS Complex would also protect 3d MAW(FWD) personnel and equipment on the Camp Bastion airfield, without fully understanding the capabilities and limitations of those units.

This misjudgment unnecessarily exposed his personnel and equipment to enemy attack on 14-15 September 2012.

He also failed to provide adequate command direction and oversight to ensure his subordinates took appropriate actions to mitigate the identified vulnerabilities on the Camp Bastion airfield.

Finally, although MajGen Sturdevant appropriately focused his forces on generating aircraft sorties to support ground operations, he failed to simultaneously address the inherent responsibility of commanders at every echelon to provide security and protection for their forces.

The documents continue, citing the failure of both to ensure an integrated defense of the base.

In layman's terms, on a base that hosts a number of units and different countries, the men responsible failed to figure out who does what in the event of an attack.

The moral? — Get ahead — mostly via good fortune of birth, circumstance, or prominent person ass-kissing — then crap on everyone else from your high perch

In America, you will be richly rewarded. Too bad that lots of other “lesser” folk will be buried, maimed, or put in the poor house.

It’s all God’s will, right?

Or as our Islamic adversaries like to say (in cultural parallel), “Insha'Allah, moth--f--k—r!”

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