Max Boot’s Article about “More Small Wars” — Is a Good Overview of What Needs to Change — It Can Be Summarized in Just One Phrase

© 2014 Peter Free

 

27 October 2014

 

 

Citation

 

Max Boot, More Small Wars: Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay, Foreign Affairs (November-December 2014)

 

 

The “duh” factor in American war-making

 

Max Boot is a national security thinker at the Council on Foreign Relations. His article summarizes the flaws in the last ten years of American war-making. I recommend reading it.

 

For those who will not, the gist is as follows — in his words:

 

 

[P]lan for what comes after the overthrow of a regime.

 

[C]hallenge rosy assumptions during the course of a conflict.

 

[C]ultivate better strategic thinkers in both the military and the civilian spheres.

 

[T]ake to heart is the importance of training for more than just short conventional operations.

 

[B]oost . . . cultural and linguistic skills.

 

[L]earn . . . [not to] rely too much on high-tech firepower and special operations forces. . . . When it comes to enforcing regime change, there is still no replacement for a rifleman on a street corner.

 

[D]on’t let logistics drive strategy.

 

[E]xercise greater authority over contractors on the battlefield.

 

[C]ooperate with foreign forces and [get] different types of U.S. forces to cooperate with one another.

 

[R]ecognize that counterinsurgency and nation building take time.

 

© 2014 Max Boot, More Small Wars: Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay, Foreign Affairs (November-December 2014) (extracts)

 

 

The moral? — In other words, “Don’t be so damn stupid”

 

Better strategists are the key. A strategist, by definition, is required to think things through in a realistic way — before, during and after the conflict.

 

Since this rule is so obvious, I suspect that the grimmer reality that I outlined a few days ago governs. When smart people do apparently dumb things repeatedly, something more devious is going on.

 

This is not to diminish the perspicacity of Max Boot’s observations. I just question his assumption that American leadership actually cares about making successful war for legitimate reasons.